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The Navy Industrial Fund Program,
nurtured by the enthusiastic acceptance
accorded it "by management, has grown from
a revolutionary experiment in government
fiscal operations to a stature of prominence
within the fiscal structure of the Navy.
—The Navy Industrial Fund Program

PREFACE
After ten years of experience with industrial fund financing, at
least one of the augured triumvirate—economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
—
has failed to materialize. Efficiency and effectiveness are difficult to
detect and measure. It could be that they too have failed to develop to the
degree that was expected. This state of affairs has caused the Navy no
little concern.
Businessmen, engineers, accountants, management consultants, and naval
officers have investigated naval activities financed "by the Navy Industrial
Fund. These activities are, after all, big business. Why is it that they
cannot be operated like big business? Explanations have ranged from general-
izations about the profit motive to conjecture about reimbursement for ship-
based sailors who use shipyard sidewalks. It may be that the experts have
been unable to see the forest for the trees. The purpose of this paper is to
examine a few leaves, some branches, and a tree or so. But, above all, the
purpose is to take an over-all look at the forest.
I believe—and hope—that the paper contains nothing except common
sense. Perhaps the content is not only common sense but also commonplace.
So ouch the better. I have attended lengthy conferences at which it has been
argued that an overtime hour at a naval shipyard actually costs less than a
straight-time hour because overhead workers are not present to support the
overtime hour. On such occasions, a touch of commonplace common sense would
not have been unwelcome.
iii

The basic problems are of considerable significance. If there are
reasons why a governmental agency in a democracy cannot run an industrial
activity in a businesslike manner, the reasons should be discovered and ex-
amined. More specifically, if there are factors inherent in the military
operation of an industry which preclude economy, efficiency, and effective-
ness, they should be made known. Do these factors present insurmountable
difficulties ! She most conservative economist cannot but concede that the
years ahead are likely to see the government entering more activities. Some
of these activities will inevitably be of the industrial-commercial type.
Closely associated, but even broader, problems have important impli-
cations. How can the cost of essential defense be held down? One President
has alerted the Nation to the problem if, in fact, there was anyone who was
not aware of it. Years ago Ihorstein Veblen wrote, "There is nothing in the
logic of the modern situation that should stop the cumulative war expendi-
tures short of industrial collapse and consequent national bankruptcy, such
as terminated the carnival of war and politics that ran its course on the
Continent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." His error in this
respect may have been exclusively one of timing. Bertrand Russell, who,
judged on his record, deserves great respect as a prognosticator, made much
the same observation during a televised seminar in the fall of 1958. Increase
ingly heavy defense expenditures are likely to force each of the democracies
to some sort of a controlled economy and to an undesirably different politi-
cal philosophy. Comments on these problems would be much beyond the scope
of this paper and this writer. But there is no harm in recognizing their ex-
istence, magnitude, and implications. And an examination of naval indus-
trial activities should show some of the problems—and some of the purported
solutions—in microcosm.
Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise (New York:
", P. W.Charles Scribner's Sons, l^WJ
iv
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This paper deals exclusively with the Navy Industrial Fund and pri-
marily with Navy Industrial Fund operations at naval shipyards. For three
years before coming to The George Washington University I was on duty at a
naval shipyard. Industrial fund financing was just beginning when I arrived.
There were many old hands about who regretted the passage of appropriation,
allotment, and project order financing. Navy Industrial Fund financing was
costly, complicated, unnecessary, and unfamiliar. I was assigned to the
Comptroller Department and later to the Supply Department. At one time my
duties involved briefing new officers on industrial fund operations; I
learned some of the objections that are difficult to answer. I participated
in the development of a two-card timekeeping system that was later abandoned.
I joined in opposition to a system of average costing labor which was ulti-
mately accepted for general use. I was present when a full-scale electronic
data processing installation was put in. In the supply billet, I attended
two or three conferences each week bearing on production problems in connec-
tion with material procurement and receipt. I had the opportunity to observe
at close range the reactions of certain members of top management to indus-
trial fund financing and to the financial reports which it permitted. Dur-
ing these years, I formed opinions about the economy, efficiency, and effec-
tiveness arising from financing a shipyard with an industrial fund.
With this background, I came to the Wavy Graduate Comptrollership
Program. Jfiy year of association with the professors and with the guest
lecturers who spoke to the Comptrollership Program confirmed some of my
opinions, but led me to modify or abandon others. The guest lecturers were
often controllers of the Nation's largest corporations or men from the top
levels of governmental finance. Their opinions merited careful considera-
tion.

The opinions I have retained are detailed In this paper. I prefer
to regard them a3 realistic rather than derogatory. Were it not for liter-
ary considerations, I would like to prefix every statement with ! I believe"
or "I think." 1 am not certain. At best the opinions are only guides as to
where the truth may be; the conclusions are only clues as to where solutions
may be found. But the reader should have little difficulty in distinguish-
ing fancy from fact, sentiment from scholarship. The more controversial
opinions have been checked with officers and civilians who now work at naval
activities financed by the Navy Industrial Fund. In all cases there is at
least one other person who agrees, but two do not make a majority. The
anecdotes are factual.
My information on Havy Industrial Fund operations at commercial-
industrial activities other than shipyards—activities such as the Naval Gun
Factory, the Naval Clothing Factory, naval printing plants, and the Military
Sea Transportation Service—comes from secondary sources. But nothing has
been said about industrial fund operations that should not apply to some
extent to all activities currently financed by the Navy Industrial Fund.
The references indicate that their problems are different in detail but
similar In origin.
I am indebted to the previous students in the Navy Graduate Comp-
trollership Program who have written on various facets of the Navy Indus-
trial Fund. I believe that I have read all of these papers; I have agreed
with some and disagreed with others. But no doubt all of them have supplied
material which I have used either directly or indirectly.
I am also indebted to many people who are working with some aspect
of the Navy Industrial Fund in the Washington area. Without exception they
were cooperative in supplying information which I requested. And I want
particularly to express appreciation to Miss Elizabeth Haggart, the
vi
.
librarian at the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts library. A good librarian
is always a joy to do business with. In doing research for this paper, it
was only necessary to suggest to Miss Haggart what I would like to find, and
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To assure continued operation of these [industrial-commercial]
activities at maximum effectiveness, efficiency, and economy, to
the satisfaction of itself and Congress, it has "become expedient
for the Navy to adopt "business methods. ^-
Background . --Working capital funds for the financing of military in-
dustrial activities were authorized by the national Security Act Amendments
of 19^9 • "Working capital funds, sometimes called 'revolving' funds are
those funds established vith a fixed amount of capital to take care of a
2
manufacturing or service operation which is self-sustaining in nature."
The authorization for the use by the alll'fcttry of such funds wa3 an
outgrowth of the first Hoover Commission report. The Commission on Organi-
zation of the Executive Branch of the Government was popularly known by the
name of a businessman who had managed "to accumulate a competence" operating
within the framework of the free enterprise system. And the task forces were
composed for the most part of prominent businessmen.
The Commission's work was "based on the belief that there
exists in the United States the kind of government and an ec-
onomic system which will assure the continuation of political
freedom and economic progress. This economic system is based
on the fundamental concept of private enterprise—not state-
owned and operated industry. The Department of Defense is
The Navy Industrial Fund Program (Washington: Department of the
Havy, Office of the Comptroller, 20 June 1956), Part I, unnumbered.
2
Lloyd Morey and Robert P. Hackett, Fundamentals of Governmental
Accounting (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1952), p. l&h.

engaged in many business enterprises. It is our belief that all
such commercial and industrial activities that can be effectively
performed by private industry should be turned over to private
industry .... Private industry should be able to meet effec-
tively the diverse and fluctuating needs of the Government. Ac-
cordingly, Government operation of business-type activities to
meet these needs is, in most cases, unnecessary."3
Holders of this philosophy in pursuit of their logic could not but
conclude that, in those rare instances when Department of Defense operation
of a business-type activity was necessary, the operation should be as business*
like as possible. She activity should be as much like private enterprise as
human ingenuity could make it.
The Commission's report was presented to Congress in January 19^9 and
contained reconmendations for promoting economy and efficiency in the National
Military Establishment. On August 10, 19^9 Congress passed Public Law 216.
Working capital funds were authorized by sections ^05(a) and 405(b) of this
law.
(a) In order to more effectively control and account for the cost
of programs and work performed in the Department of Defense,
ifefl Secretary of Defense is authorized to require the estab-
lishment of working capital funds in the Department of Defense
for the purpose cf
—
(1) financing inventories of such stores, supplies, materials,
and equipment us he may designate ; and
(2) providing working capital for such industrial type acti-
vities as pro/ide common services within or among the de-
partments and agencies of the Department of Defense, as
he may designate.
(b) The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to
establish on the books of the Treasury Department at the re-
quest of the Secretary of Defense the working capital funds
established pursuant to the authority of this section. **
3Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
Sub-committee Report on Business Enterprises of the Department of Defense
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, June, 1955), PP» 1-3-
U. S. 8lst Congress, The National Security Act Amendment of 19^9,
P.L. 216, Aug. 10, 1949, sees. 405(a) and 405(b).

3Since 19^9* therefore, "inherent in the Financial Management Plan of
the Navy is the concept of an increasing utilization of the working capital
revolving fund for the purpose of financing the Navy's industrial-commercial
5
type activities."
Implementation . —The Defense Printing Service was converted to indus-
trial funding in 19^+9 • Other industrial-commercial activities were converted
on staggered schedules. By 1956 there were forty-six naval activities fin-
anced by the Kavy Industrial Fund. The annual, volume of business of acti-
vities chartered under the Fund has grown from approximately 5 million
7dollars to nearly 1.5 billion dollars.
'
Dae Navy handled the transition from appropriation-allotment-project
order accounting to industrial fund financing for the susceptible activities
with admirable smoothness. [Torpedoes were about and no one damned them. In
most cases before granting an industrial fund charter to an activity, the
situation was fully investigated by representatives from the Office of the
Comptroller of the Navy, the Bureau concerned, and the staff of the activity.
These men formed a working group which studied the organization, analyzed its
problems, and drafted an industrial fund handbook tailored to the activity's
requirements. Difficult problems were encountered. Some of them were
8
solved and others remain troublesome to this day.
5^
The Kavy Industrial Fund Program, Part I.
Ibid .
7
'L. W. Haddock, "Proposed Improvements in the Navy's Industrial
Fund." Unpublished Professional Paper for Promotion to Commander, Navy
Depariaaent, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Oct. 20, 1958 > P» 1«
Cdr. L. W. Haddock's promotion thesis, "Proposed Improvements in the
Navy's Industrial Fund," is an astute discussion of technical problems still
hampering attainment of some benefits made possible by NIF financing. The
discussion is based on the author's experience as Comptroller at the U. S.
Naval Ordnance Plant, Louisville, Kentucky. In brief, a variable cost budget
should be adopted. [The Bureau of Ships now has the variable cost budget
under active consideration]. Such appropriation accounting as remains at

hPersonnel, both civilian and military, qualified to handle the
technicalities of industrial fund financing were in short supply. In cer-
tain areas, appropriation accounting then had and now has to he reconciled
with industrial fund accounting; an industrial fund activity's customers
receive their funds from appropriations and a certain amount of appropria-
tion, project order, and allotment accounting is still required. There were
NIF activities should be reduced or, if possible, eliminated. Inventories
should be combined to simplify inventory management. The accuracy of cost
accumulation should be increased by charging sick and annual leave charges
as overhead; at the present time these costs are covered by accelerating
labor a predetermined fixed percentage. Accruals should be made for the in-
come to be realized from the sale of excess material. Proceeds of scrap
sales should be credited to the cost center generating the scrap; no effort
is currently made to allocate this income.
Even this lengthy and perceptive dissertation, however, omits many
of the technical problems which exist. Since the accounting systems were
tailored to each activity, the accounting systems are not in some respects
comparable; for this reason, financial reports from similar activities are
not in all respects comparable. Free issue materials [materials charged
to an end-use appropriation at the time of their procurement], military
pay, employee fringe benefits, and depreciation on plant and equipment
are not charged to product costs. Thus, a very significant element in
total costs is excluded when product costs are computed. Maval industrial
activities have capacities based on emergency conditions; what adjustment
can be made for the cost of standby capacity? Standard cost accounting
systems and engineered work measurement programs would be desirable for
naval industrial activities. Experiments with standard costing have
been made at the Charleston Naval Shipyard. But valid engineered stand-
ards are exceptionally hard to come by in shipbuilding which is one of
the most complex of all manufacturing processes. Procedures change with
changes in design. Those naval activities manufacturing and testing
prototypes obviously present even greater obstacles to the establishment
of standards. Standards tend to be historic and none-too-valid or use-
ful. What can be done to separate accurately and uniformly the purely
military portion of a naval activity's effort from the industrial portion?
What part in dollars and cents of the inventory of an NIF activity is
financed by the $avy Supply System. Is adjustment necessary in the
interest of accurate costs? Is duplication of effort ever justified in
the interest of accurate costs? For example, should a separate supply
department financed by HIF be set up at naval shipyards? Any one of
these problems could be discussed at length, pro and con.

many other technical problems but they were either solved or circumvented,
9
although not always in an entirely satisfactory manner.
The Navy Industrial Funa Concept , —-Oonversion to industrial fund
financing was authorized by an approved charter for each individual activity
Individual cash allocations to the various activities were made from the
corpus of the fund. The initial working capital of an activity was composed
of this allocation plus the inventories of materials and supplies which were
on hand. After cut-over, this working capital is used to finance the costs
of production. These costs are recovered by billing the customers. Collec-
tions are made and credited to the cash account of the fund. Billings are
made at cost, and ideally no profit or loss would arise from operations. In
practice, the overhead required to recover costs can rarely be estimated
that precisely. Profit or loss—called over-absorption or under-absorptio
is carried forward and burdens or benefits future customers.
The industrial fund is not subject to quarterly or annual limita-
tions. Materials and supplies can be procured to meet the requirements of
orders on hand. There are no compelling financial reasons for stock-piling
inventories or for expending funds about to expire on 30 June. The capitali-
zation is adequate to finance increases in workload on an interim basis, and
9
Much more complete discussions of the problems attending transition
to Navy Industrial Fund financing are contained in: Bobert J. Duryea, "The
Navy Industrial Fund at the U. S. Naval Gun Factor., . Unpublished taper
prepared for the Navy Graduate Comptrollership Program, The George Washington
University, 195£> PP» 7 - 19 i G. L. Countryman,
TiNew Comptroller System
Introduced in Shipyards," The Bureau of Ships Journal, August, 1953* P» 23;
and E. Scott Tilley, "Use of Working Capital Funding by the Navy's Bureau of
Ordnance, " The Controller, August, 1953* P« 37^ •

6provision has been made to modify capitalization in accordance with require-
ments.
Each type of industrial fund activity shall Lave cost esti-
mating and cost accounting systems specifically designed for
its operations. Wherever appropriate, the cost accounting system
shall employ standard- cost methods rather than methods which are
designed solely in terms of historical costs. In appropriate
cases, the cost accounting system may be a job order cost system,
a process cost system, or a suitable combination. In any case,
the cost accounting system shall be integrated with the general
accounting system, diich shall observe the accrual basis of ac-
counting and employ the double-entry method of bookkeeping.-^
GJhe cost of products and services includes direct material, direct
labor, other direct costs, and operating and administrative overhead. 'Ihe
costs of military pay and depreciation are excluded] a statistical estimate
of these costs la sometimes made for information purposes.
Hie Navy Industrial Fund concept involves financing industrial- com-
mercial naval activities in a manner similar to that used by private indus-
tries of comparable size. !Eae general accounting system is the double entry,
accrual type. An appropriate cost accounting system is superimposed on the
general accounting system. Ipso facto , for all practical purposes, a free
enterprise business has been set up. Circumstance unfortunately dictates
that it be government-owned. But in theory there are no reasons why the
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of which American business is justly
proud cannot be achieved; in fact, no reasons why economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness will not inevitably result.
ftiis SJ rather like saying that two men sitting in identical chairs
are identical men. After some effort, perhaps inconclusive, to establish
Regulations Governing Industrial Fund Operations , NavCompt Instruc-
tion 7630 .1A ( Washington : Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller,
29 August 195o), P. 1^.
cf# Ihe Navy Industrial Fund Program, Part I, Sec. III.

that the man are not identical, this paper vlli consider same of the




It most be kept constantly in mind that the installation
of industrial and commercial type activities is no guarantee
of their successful operation.'
Claims .--The claims that were made for industrial fund financing
after its inception were at least equal to the beautiful dreams that attended
its conception and the gloving predictions that accompanied its Implementa-
tion. There were detractors about, but they were seldom heard. On the other
hand, the Fund's proponents had little difficulty finding a medium for the
promulgation of their approval. LJany songs were sung in praise of the navy
Industrial Fund that could just as reasonably have been sung in praise of
motherhood, brotherhood,, unity, or cooperation.
Probably the highest single factor where savings will be
realized for sometime under NIF will be in the material field
. . . off-yard procurements are given more consideration in
terms of definite retjuiresaents . . . the possibility of substi-
tutions of one item for another to effect cost savings i3 being
considered more favorably by stub originators resulting in
material economies.
The vehicle provided by NIF for accumulating material in
EMI has permitted stocking of materials which heretofore created
production bottlenecks • . . "kitty" material has been substan-
tially eliminated by inclusion in the shop store inventory.
Acid pickling of STS steel plates, in lieu of sandblasting
is expected to save the Shipyard $119*COO .... The Shipyard
saved approximately $17,500. through the elimination of unneces-
sary forms and reports.
The Navy Industrial Fund budget by directly relating costs
to cost classes under the israedlate cognizance of the Cost
12
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) as quoted in The Havy
Industrial Fund Program, Part H, Chart 8.

Center supervisor, makes it possible for that individual to main-
tain control over practically all costs in his cost center, a con-
trol which is a necessary collateral to the concept of cost con-
sciousness .... Since the inception of the Bavy Industrial Fund,
materials on hand in the various shops in the amount of $598, 392,000.
. i . have been recorded as an asset of the Navy Industrial Fund.
This development has intensified the control of material and should
greatly reduce the material losses that invariably result from pil-
ferage, damage, misplacement, and obsolescence.
She use of an accounting system similar to that used in private
industry is making our financial systems more dynamic in that they
can now be patterned after systems and procedures being continuously
developed in this professional field.
Hot only can timely retrenchment be effected but the application
of NIF cost accounting principles makes possible the recognition of
the areas of possible retrenchment more clearly and the Judging of
marlmum possible reductions more precisely and safely, thus stimu-
lating a consciousness of costs on the part of management, with a
corresponding motivation to cut costs.
Management has been encouraged to evaluate progress under the
Industrial Fund system of accounting in such areas as dollar-saving,
improved efficiency of operations, cost control, and flexibility of
operations. 13
Even during this early period of high hopes, however, some discord-
ant notes of caution crept in;
It behooves us to move among a lower echelon, the employees
who are the middle management group of activities where N.I.F.
has been introduced and observe their reactions .... Some of
their comments are paraphrased thus: .... Besults of today's
operation which management receives a week later are about as in-
formative as a week-old newspaper .... Many reports have to be
submitted to maoagement bureaus, but do the bureaus know what to
do with them? They have no control over the funds except to the
degree of their participation as customers, yet they insist on
lengthy and expensive reports .... Sometimes the workload
fluctuates excessively. If the reduced demand is announced by
the customer well in advance, management can plan ahead. But if
it is on short notice, layoffs take time .... This system will
never be less expensive and require fewer personnel if two systems
(appropriations and Sf.I.F. ) are superimposed* They are not com-
patible .... If a quantity Item becomes a specialty item, be-
cause of very reduced uses as a result of new techniques and
advances, the continued use of facilities and personnel becomes
an expediency rather than a dollar-wise program .... If you
13
Selected Excerpts from Management Comment Concerning Operations
under IHF," as quoted in The Bavy Industrial Fund Program, Bart IV.

10
can go out and mk government business (aa some N.I.F. activities
can) you fare much "better than if you must wait and have the busi-
ness sent to you. 1^
As management became more familiar with financial and cost
information developed through the system, it was realized that
a wealth of information was available that was not used to the
fullest extent during the first years' operation.
The first year of experience did not result in measurable
Industrial dollar savings in the cost of production. Under the
Industrial management concept the foundation has been laid -,«.
whereby definitive management control programs can be Installed. ?
The plain truth seems to be that more was expected from and claimed
for Industrial fund financing than could be achieved by any change In budg-
etary and accounting procedures.
An issue has several times been made of the fact that many
of the things accomplished under the industrial fund could have
been done without it. In some cases, full accruals for instance,
this is true in the sense that other enabling legislation would
have been possible. In other cases, the double entry technique
for instance, the reform could possibly have been accomplished
by directive within a military department, or within a technical
service. However, these desirable things had not come about
prior to the availability of the industrial fund chartering.
The industrial fund is simply one way of effecting these changes,
and it is a presently available way of doing the long postponed
Job.16
Realities . —Efficiency which is defined as "effective operation as
measured by a comparison of production with cost in energy, time, money,
etc.," ' and effectiveness which is defined as "efficiency, are difficult
to measure. But it seems likely that they can be influenced by many
Ik
Leonard M. Cul^at, 'The Savy Industrial Fund. 1 ' Unpublished paper
prepared for the Navy Graduate Oomptrollership Program, The George Washington
University, January, 1957* PP» 22-2k.
1*5
'"Selected Excexpts from Management Oomment Concerning Operations
under HIF, " as quoted in The Bavy Industrial Fund Program, Part 17.
l6U. S. Department of Defense, fleport of The Industrial Activities
Working Group . A report prepared for the Advisory Committee on Fiscal Organ-
ization and Procedures. {Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense,
July, 19M, P. 5&.
^Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (5th ed.; Springfield, Mass.:
G & C. Marrlam Co., 1SW? P* 313. *
lUTV4J

factors other than the methods of financing, budgeting, and accounting
used.
Economy, on the other hand, which is defined as "thrifty administra-
19
tion, often retrenchment in expenditures, strict husbanding of resources,"
can be estimated in dollars. The overhead rates of naval shipyards since
they adopted industrial fund financing have been tabulated. The composite
overhead rate is an amount which, when applied to direct labor hours, is
calculated to recover the cost of general and administrative expenses and
indirect manufacturing costs. The figures shown in Table 1 at least suggest
that industrial fund financing has not automatically produced economy.
It may be that some naval industrial activities have done better than
the shipyards. But it would be an intelligent guess that those which produce
prototypes have been unable to hold overhead costs down.
In spite of the achievements which must be described as falling
short of the predictions, the purposes and objectives of industrial funds
remain the same.
Industrial funds are designed to:
1. Provide a more effective means of controlling the costs of
goods and services required to be produced or furnished by
industrial- and commercial-type activities, and a more ef-
fective and flexible means for financing, budgeting, and
accounting for the costs thereof (however, the establish*
ment of an improved accounting system is not by itself a
purpose justifying the installation of an industrial fund);
2. Create and recognize "buyer-seller" relationships between
industrial- and commercial-type activities and those acti-
vities which budget for and order the end-products or ser-
vices, in order to provide management advantages and incen-
tives for efficiency and economy;
3. Provide to managers of industrial- and commercial-type acti-
vities the financial authority and flexibility required to
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The figures, which were taken from the monthly financial state-
ments submitted by the shipyards, were supplied by the Office of the
Comptroller, Bureau of Slips.
In the interest of truth and accuracy, it should be pointed out
that the figures are not completely comparable among shipyards or among
periods for the sane shipyard. Various technical changes have been made
in accounting procedures at each of the shipyards. In some instances
costs once charged directly to jobs are now charged as overhead. The table
should not be construed to mean that NTF financing contributes to increas-
ing eosts. Nor should the figures be taken to indicate waste and a dis-
regard for costs on the part of the Navy. There have been three increases
in Civil Service pay during the period covered. The purchasing power of
the dollar has declined four percentage points. Everyone is aware that
the costs of most military equipment have gone up. The work of naval ship-
yards is growing more complex rapidly, and this fact, of course, necessi-
tates increased overhead expenditures. Mare Island, for example, is now
building nuclear Polaris boats. The figures are used only to illustrate




k. Encourage more cross-servicing among the military departments
and among their operating agencies, vith the aim of obtaining
more economical use of facilities
;
5. Support the performance budgeting concept "by facilitating "budg-
eting and reporting for the costs of end-products, and thus
underlining the cost consequences of decision making, including
choices between alternatives in such terms.
Specific objectives, when industrial funds are used, include the
following:
1. To furnish managers of industrial- and commercial-type activities
with modern management tools comparable to those utilized by
efficient private enterprises engaged in similar types of
activities;
2. To provide an incentive for managers of industrial fund acti-
vities to improve cost estimating and cost control through the
use of cost standards by requiring a contractual relationship
between producers and ordering agencies
j
3* Require alert, forward-looking financial planning at industrial-
and commercial-type activities by making them dependent financi-
ally on reimbursements received for goods and services furnished
in fulfilling orders from customers;
k» Impel producers of goods and services to control costs in line
with workloads actually generated by customers ' orders, varying
the labor force and inventories accordingly and avoiding the
tendency to maintain a labor force and inventories without re-
gard to fluctuations in workload levels, taking into considera-
tion the prescribed wartime capability requirements;
5. To coordinate the financial aspects of detailed estimating and
planning for job performance in terms of material requirements
and labor operations, production scheduling and control, and
procurement and inventory control, with budgeting and cost
control;
6. To establish and use realistic cost standards as targets rather
than detailed cost limitations;
7» Bequire order agencies to budget, control and account for the
cost of all goods and services ordered, rather than allow them
to obtain free goods and services; this requirement is designed
to instill in the officials of these agencies a greater sense of
responsibility and self-restraint in limiting their orders, and
balancing the cost of specific goods and services to be ordered
against the benefits and advantages of their procurement,
especially In the light of alternative or competing demands
j
8. To place ordering agencies in the position of critic of purchase
prices (i.e., costs of performing activities) as well as quality
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and delivery-speed of goods and services ordered in considera-
tion of relative costs of similar performing activities and
outside agencies;
9» Provide meaningful bills to ordering agencies, clearly relating
Idle goods and services furnished by a performing activity to
the charges rendered, causing the ordering agencies to assess
their procurement practices and specifications in full aware-
ness of the costs involved;
10. Enable ordering agencies to budget and account on an "end
product" basis (the same as when buying from commercial con-
tractors), simplifying budget presentations, budgetary control,
and accounting procedures for both producers and ordering
agencies;
11. 2b establish, -wherever feasible, predetermined prices (tariff
schedules, price lists, fixed-price orders) for goods and ser-
vices furnished by industrial fund activities, thus setting
standard prices on performance enabling ordering agencies to
plan and budget more confidently;
12. 2b encourage management of ordering agencies to improve program
planning and scheduling, in response to producers' efforts to
negotiate for orders as far in advance as possible.^
J
Of these objectives, only the first has been achieved beyond equivo-
cation. It is doubtful that the most die-hard proponent of appropriation,
allotment, and project order accounting would now contend that industrial
fund financing is not an improvement. Industrial fund financing does pro-
vide a more effective and flexible means for financing, budgeting, and
accounting for costs at industrial and commercial type activities. 2he fig-
ures themselves may not indicate economy, but they are being compiled eco-
nomically. And there is a great deal to be said for accumulating the costs
as accurately and efficiently as possible. 2he picture may be unpleasant,
but it is more likely to be a true one.
A very large proportion of accounting for Defense Department
activities is at present on the single entry method. Single entry
i3 simply Incomplete accounting in that it fails to recognize the
20




"basic double effect of every business happening. This is the
really significant criticism of single entry—by seeking to be
siaple, it is incomplete and thus very often fails to portray
the business situation in a way that is truly useful to manage-
ment .... It so happens that the industrial fund chartered
operation is a "natural" for double entry accounting. In the
long run, this may prove to be the greatest advantage of the
industrial fund technique for it helps to establish the climate
in which full portrayal of management data is easy to achieve.
Of course, double entry is possible without the formal machinery
of the industrial fund charter but experience to date has shown
that it tends to come very slowly in Defense industrial activi-
ties without some such incentive.
2
1
A careful reading of the other purposes and objectives indicates
that a disproportionate number of them are dependent upon the establishment
of a genuine buyer-seller relationship between naval consumers and producers.
They are statements and restatements, variations on a thene, of the benefits
that can arise from the relationship. But only the roughest approximation
of a true buyer-seller relationship has as yet developed between naval con-
sumsrs and producers. And there are good reasons why such a relationship
may never develop to the extent envisaged:
Considerable debate has been devoted to the possibility of
developing an effective buyer-seller relationship as a control
device through the use of the industrial fund. Proponents have
overdone this argument. There are some restricted circumstances,
in which the Defense Department "buyers'* have real freedom and
in those cases, the buyer-seller psychology may be useful. How-
ever, to a considerable extent the buyer is a captive, as for in-
stance, the Bureau of Ships in obtaining its overhauls, or the
Air Force in providing major repairs for its planes. These "cus-
tomers" have no real chance for freedom of source of supply andpp
here the buyer-seller relationship is theoretic in the extreme.
Of the purposes and objectives which are not dependent on a buyer-
seller relationship, some have been achieved intermittently, others may be
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achieved, and still others will never be achieved. Why? Becaua©—to state
tersely what will be elaborated—no matter how much a military activity may
resemble a business, there are basic differences. Captain 13. H. Batcheller,
U.S.N., the Comptroller Of the Bureau of Ships and a former production offi-
cer at a na*ral shipyard, vont right to the heart of the matter when he said:
One thing has ttfMN hard to get across to civilians and
especially to Congressmen. A shipyard may resemble a civilian
business--the civilian committees have thought so—but it is not,
and it vill never be in certain vital respects the same. 2he
primary considerations are military considerations: meeting
schedules, doing work that meets Ittl batters military specifica-
tions, making technological changes to fulfill now military re-
quirements. In tfcavery nature of things , cost is set the pri-
mary" crair.ider&tion.^
/ Fi.nnnc5.al considerations are not the only cone .ions which in-
fluence military decisions. Frequently the military must trade dollars for




"Interview with Captain 2. H. Satcheller, U.S.K., Comptroller of
the Bureau of Slips, l-mxch 1&4 1959*
' Lecture by rrofessor Clewlow, Navy G -adnata Coaiptrollership Program,
2he George Washington University, March 18, 195.

CHAPTER III
THE KaVY INDUSTRIAL FUKD A3D THE MILITARY MIND
\
What sets off this particular- sort of manager from executives
of other types of enterprise is not really the uniform or the
salute, the little ceremonies and trappings, or the specilized
vocabulary. Business (to a greater degree than It might care to
admit) has its equivalents of all these. The essential difference
lies in the responsibility of the military manager, whatever his
rank. That responsibility is simply—and totally- -the safety of
the U. S., a weight nowadays enough to stagger an Atlas. When it
comes to defining that weight in dollars, the military mind often
looks maddeningly inexact, if not wildly irresponsible. 25
In 195^ the Industrial Activities Working Group—a group made up of
businessmen, business administration professors, and nanagement consuntaats—
undertook a study of the organisation, responsibilities, principles and pro-
cedures of Department of ijefense industrial establishments. In their excep-
tionally comprehensive and perceptive report, they stated that as a result
of their visits and background studies it was clear that the predominant need
was that of genuine industrial leadership. They may have been right at
the time. Such a statement would not be Justified now, not, at least, so far
as the Navy is concerned. Close and reasonably objective observation indi-
cates that the Havy has found, within the ranks of its military and civilian
personnel, industrial leadership of the very highest order. The men chosen
to command the Eavy's industrial activities and the men chosen to serve as
comptrollers compare favorably with the comptrollers from big business who
5f,The U. S. Military Mind, 1 ' Fortune, February, 1952, p. 93.




have lectured to the Bavy Graduate Conrptrollership Program. Ilie Navy has
(what is to some) a surprisingly large number of men who can comprehend the
intricacies of double entry "bookkeeping, of job or progress cost accounting,
of budgeting, and of balance sheets and income statements. In other respects,
industrial leadership is not really different from military leadership which
is not itself strikingly different from leadership.
The Havy has wisely followed the policy of making comptrollers for
engineering activities from engineers, comptrollers for aviation activities
27
from aviators, and comptrollers for ordnance activities from ordnance men.
Qms good industrial leaders have been obtained and they have been obtained
at bargain prices.
But having written the kudos in all honesty, sincerity, and objectivity,
it is necessary to add a few provisos to qualify the praise. Mot everyone
would consider the navy's current industrial leadership as "good" or even
adequate. She principal reason they would not has been mentioned before: at
military industrial activities, cost considerations are seldom paramount.
She officers 1 fitness report form has provided for the rating of each officer
27
'2he writer is not prepared to say that the Savy's Supply Corps
officers are not potentially brilliant industrial leaders. But he believes,
for example, that the Ifcxvy is likely to have better success in indoctrinating
engineers with an appreciation of accounting than accountants with an appreci-
ation of engineering. Supply Corps officers should make the be3t comptrollers
for any activity that is not engaged in a specialized productive operation and
for supply activities. HSiis is based on the belief that accounting is not as
esoteric as accountants would have laymen believe. But the matter is highly
controversial, and the Industrial activities Working Group seems to have dis-
agreed. On page 6k of their report they state: "Ihe Ilavy's practice of ap-
pointing E.D»0. officers as comptrollers is an interesting device attesting
to the fact that the Havy simply has no one really trained for the job. It
is the Bavy' s hope that the sheer high calibre of these men may make up for
their lack of specific training. Some of them will doubtless do respectable
jobs by a judicious combination of rapid learning, frankly leaning on their
civilian deputies, and pure good judgment, ©lis is not, however, the pattern
which any of the services snoula follow." Bevertheless, the fir3t prerequi-
site of a comptroller—in the broadest, grandest sense—must surely be a
thorough understanding of the technical aspects of the industrial or commer-
cial activity which he is serving.
.
19
on a quality called "cost consciousness." But the fact remains that to date
the personal success or failure of an officer has not "been determined by his
success or failure in controlling costs.
It is not that the officer is contemptuous of the dollar, of
which he is paid so few, and on which he shells out taxes like
anyone else. So far as military economy involves the most guns
or the most shoes at the lowest possible unit costs, the officer
reacts like any corporation manager. But he is involved in
scheduling net only production but also consumption and he dare
not underestimate. 2o
In order to avoid failure as the "president" of one of the Havy's in-
dustrial- comaercial activities, a naval officer must have qualities that do
not often occur in combination. When they do occur in combination, they
usually sell for about $100, 000. per year plus bonuses, stock options, and
expense accounts. Oie activity commander must be an expert on the productive
operation -which he is directing. Shipbuilding is among the most complex of
all productive processes, and one would hesitate to describe the current
work of ordnance enterprises as simple. Since the Navy has long had men
working in these activities, officers with the requisite technical skills
are not impossible to find. But the commander must also be an administrator
of extraordinary skill; his span of control will probably encompass ten
29department heads. * These department heads are likely to be dynamic, ambi-
tious, capable men themselves, and at least four of them will have frequent,
urgent, major problems which require the commander's attention. As a prac-
tical matter, shop masters must often be included in the commander's span,
and this increases the complexities, let us say, substantially.
28
"tttt U. S. Military Mind," Fortune , February, 1952, p. 93-
29^Standard U. S. Maval Shipyard regulations , BuShips Instruction




When activity commanders preside over conferences with shop masters,
the impression is one of a Ccamonwealth conference. Almost without exception,
shop rasters are men of great ability, men who know their jobs and know they
know them; they are not Milquetoasts and they are not anxious to naive changes
in familiar and proven procedures; in their shops they are often autocrats;
in conference they are not shy. Activity commanders need human relations
skills. In addition, an activity commander should he a public relations man
with a deft touch; it is well if he can deliver sincere speeches with con-
fidence and assurance. And, within the limitations imposed on military per-
sonnel, he must be a politician; in fact, he could use the skills of which
Machia/elli dreamed*
From men with such qualifications, the Havy has selected its indus-
trial leaders. Perhaps it is not too surprising that these rjen have not
always been experts on finance, accounting, cost accumulation, and cost con-
trol. One reason they are not experts, and the reason they do not pay more
attention to the men who are, can be found in the circumstance that cost
control has rarely, if ever, been among the principal criteria of military
success.
Many cximmanding officers (not necessarily of industrial-ccamnercial
activities) have made their reputations in peacetime by cleaning up stations,
erecting new buildings, improving material conditions, devising new proce-
dures, developing or improving military equipment, getting somewhere
faster. Where is the naval officer whose reputation rests securely on cost
cutting? There may have been one or two such men around the Pentagon in the
days of Lsuis A. Johnson, of blessed memory, but they have, no doubt, been
exiled as traitors by now. Baval officers are judged by their accomplish-
ments and these accomplishments are seldom costed.
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This can be illustrated by a story in which an adiiiral takes pride.
The admiral vas once depressed by aging quonsets at his command. They were,
in his sight, obscenities. He asked his public works officer what could be
done, and the public works officer said they could be painted. The admiral
replied that paint would never solve a problem of such gravity, and he
asked, "Why don't you shingle them?" The public works officer replied that
quonsets were never, in his experience, shingled. The admiral says he said,
"Damn iti I said shingle those quonsets J" In due course, the quonsets were
shingled. In point of fact, this admiral has unquestioned and unquestionable
military merits, but cost consciousness is not among the more conspicuous.
In the case of the commanders of industrial-commercial activities, it
is well that cost is not the primary consideration. If under prevailing
conditions it were to "become so, the conscientious commander would inevitably
break down from frustration or despair.

OhAPTiSR IV
THE MX INDUSTRIAL Ful© A&j SSflB ACTIVITY COMMAHDBR
Responsibility for financial management is centralized in the
activity commander at the activity level. 30
The foregoing quotation may well be an accurate statement of the
theory. There is no doubt that an activity commander, if he wishes to irake
the disproportionate effort, can control the number of pencils consumed, the
amount of carbon paper used, and perhaps even the number and types of elec-
tronic data processing machines installed. In regard to the vital factors
necessary to anything tuat could truly be labelled rifinancial management,"
however, the activity commander's authority is either insufficient or non-
existent.
Only in rare instances can he affect the amount and type of produc-
tion. His ability to influence the selection, placement, and retention of
his top management personnel is restricted. He is unable to adjust employ-
ment levels to production levels as rapidly as economy and efficiency would
dictate were they the only considerations. Military procurement and eijpendi-
ture regulations interfere seriously with his control over material costs.
The president of a civilian corporation who found himself unable to influence
production, to hire ana fire personnel, and to use judgment in an attempt to
control material costs would regard his "responsibility for financial manage-
ment" as somewhat attenuated.
30




Assignment of a responsibility to an individual entails his
assuming the duty to carry out the action necessary to his ac-
complishment, within the framework of relationships, structure,
policy, and procedure obtaining in the situation* Performing
the responsibility requires not only acceptance by the individual
but also requires recognition and support by those with whom he
must deal in fulfilling his task. This principle is commonly
put thus, "Each assignment of responsibility inquires correspond-
ing delegation of authority. "31
The truth is that responsibility for financial management has not
been and cannot be centralized at the activity level. Some of the authority
absolutely requisite to financial management has been retained in Washington.
Control of Production. --"The amount aud type of production for naval
industrial-commercial activities is determined at bureau or higher levels.
There are, of course, rare, isolated instances in which activity commanders
have been able to modify their -workloads. The jSaval Gun ^Factory searches for
32
and finds work to keep its lens grinders in business. Shipyard commanders
have on occasion bid competitively for windfall work—work arising from un-
planned boiler explosions aboard Coast Guard vessels. Obviously these are
the exceptions! their' over-all Influence is negligible.
It has happened more often that an activity commander has learned of
his ensuing workload for the first time by reading the newspaper. He finds
it announced there by the senators or representatives who represent the
states or districts where his employees live.
It happened once that a senator obtained an important amount of new
construction for a naval shipyard "simply by going in and asking." The
senator remarked to the reporters that since it was so easy to get this new
construction for the yard out of the Bavy, one might as well try for some
*4fary Gushing Holes, The Essence of Management (Hew York: Harper &
Brothers, 195&), P« 1^9 •
^Lecture by Captain Bewick, U.S. 25., Comptroller of the I-Javal Gun
Factory, at The George Washington University, December 9, 1958*

rare. She budget division and others at the shipyard involved could only
hope that the senator would Keep them informed.
qhAg iucidont emphasises that the workload at naval Industrial acti-
vities 4a detexxdned by political, economic* and military considerations*
She decisions are made at the highest levels, apparently productJ.au costs
are not prioary determinants* Ihe decisions are not iaado—and, in fact, con
rarely "be influeacea>~-by the activity commanders.
Oontrol of ^rsonasd. *--Perhaps It is shocking to suggest that a
military csosuander does not have control of personnel* Be can tell the
have control* Bit if he is a reasonable nan he will not tell them to tran-
scend their abilities* And. subject to minor exceptions, he cannot dictate
vho vill he assigned to himj in this sense, he does not have control*
SSiere are no reasons vhy an activity coasaaader must tolerate out-
and-out incompetents among his top management personnel* 2hare are, however,
reasons vhy he must tolerate men whom he might not choose for his top managa-
assignment and rotation plans for military personnel and civil service pro*
cedures result in placing th& best available men in the top jobs. She ac-
tivity commander must live with these facts of life* Military personnel
rotate ; a successful production officer will move on after four or five years
on the job; theoretically, this is in the interest of the production officer
and of the Rtvy. Top civilian personnel are frequently old-timers with
thirty or more years at the activity. Often they are excellent men who pro-
vide the continuity which would otherwise be lacking* But sonetimes they are
not. In all cases they are difficult to dislodge short of retirement*
Shese factors cause naval industrial-commercial activities to differ from
civilian enterprises of comparable size more than might be expected*
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Some of the lecturers to the Bavy Graduate Gsqptrollership Program
have given an Indication of the exact e;rbent and inportance of this differ-
ence. John Van Pelt, a management expert, and now Vice President, Treasurer,
and Controller of Vulcan Materials, indicated the extreme care -which Vulcan
Materials exercises in appointing a man to a management position. Top manage-
ment personnel often serve an apprenticeship of tJhree or four years with an
"acting" designation "before being appointed to a top job. This is the case
even though the man has been with the company for many years, because "once
in, he is very hard to get out. Vulcan Materials wants to be certain that
the man is right for the jod."" Three or four years is, of course, the
typical length of a naval officer's tour in a top management job at a naval
industrial activity.
Daniel MDulton of the Sudget Division of General Electric spoke of
Mr. Cordiner's emphasis on having the right men in top management jobs. This
has resulted in not infrequent transfers and firings &ft the upper echelons of
3k
management at General Electric. Top management can be shifted or removed
at a naval industrial activity. But Civil Service regulations are such—and
local and state politics are such—that an activity eosaaander might well find
the "benefits less than coemaansurate to the effort.
Military top management personnel are transient and Civil Service top
management personnel are static. These facta place naval industrial activi-
ties at a disadvantage in comparison with their industrial counterparts. And
they give a partial explanation of one of the findings of the Industrial Acti-
vities Working Group: "Too many people were assigned to management jobs for
35
which they were not qualified by training and experience. ***
-^Lecture by John Van Pelt to the Bavy Graduate Comptrollershlp Pro-
gram, The George Wasnington University, March 19, 1959*
-^Lecture by Daniel Moulton to the Havy Graduate Comptrollership
Program, The George Washington University, February 5, 1959*
•
^Jteport of the Industrial Activities Working Group, p. 63.
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problems in connection with per diem employees, IVB personnel,
and middle management military personnel are similar. She per diem employees
in the aggregate, however, present some additional difficulties. Decisions
regarding employment levels are made by the naval bureau having management
contro3. of the industrial activity. Sudden changes in military technology,
strategy, and tactics contimially necessitate adjustments in the workloads
of industrial activities. One launching of Sputnik I is an example of the
sort of thing that can change military plans quickly. But decisions to re-
duce or increase the roanning levels at industrial activities lag—often un-
conscionably—the decisions concerning workloads. As a result, all too often
individual activities are not operating at an employment level which approxi-
mates the optimum. There are good reasons why such must be the case, but no
one would argue that the situation acts to reduce costs.
[J3ie situation does in fact lead, to events such as the following;
She budget director at an industrial activity where tM applied overhead
rate wa3 falling to absorb expenses once suggested, with as much seriousness
as cynicism, that they hire more direct labor employees. He admitted that
there was no work for Wmm to do and they would just stand around the -water-
front. But if they were employed it would be unnecessary to raise the over-
head rate since there would be more direct labor hours to which the old rate
could be applied. And, after all, the overhead rate had been premised on an
increase in workload which had been promised but which had not materialized.
Hot all features of industrial fund financing are always conducive to lower
COSt3,
Increases in manning levels are not impossible to bring about. *Ihe
recruiting mills grind slowly and it is no easy matter to find the skilled
personnel needed by naval industrial activities. Bat the increase can
usually be accomplished in a satisfactory manner in good time. Reductions in
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force present the real problems. They ore always matters of political
interest. 2he activity commander is likely to find himself in a vortex of
rumors, counter ...\tmors, charges, and countercharges • Some of them emanate
from Washington. If the reduction in force cannot be avoided, it will
eventually come about. Hot, however, before the activity commander's skill
as a public relations man has been tested, and not before the delay has cost
many dollars. *3ie fact that the discharge of a GS-3, using the time-tested
technique of abolishing his job, was once the subject of intense senatorial
irrteiest should indicate the magnitude of the problem.
It is -worth noting specifically that although -veterans' preference
in civil service employment na*y be justified, it cannot be .justified on the
basis that it leads to optimum utilization of available personnel.
QSie president of a civilian enterprise, who would probably have his
problems with the unions, would still find the position of the commandex-
a naval industrial activity intolei-able insofar as the control of personnel
is concerned.
Control of M&terial .--a^eryone knows that material costs have been
rising. Hot everyone knows that a naval activity corroa.uder is in a singularly
poor position to control his material costs. It may be that the regulations
which hamstring him are all for the best, "but tb mainly make it impos-
sible for him to operate in the manner common among civilian businessmen. At
the moment, for example, he cannot be stockpiling steel at a rate which a
civilian manager might deem desirable. Much of his 3teel inventory is
financed by the Savy Stock Fund. 3avy Stock Fuud eiq^eaultures are controlled
at levels above the activity level-—by Congress, by the Bureau of Supplies
and Accounts, by a Supply Demand Control Point. Since Issues are made from
the Bavy Stock Account at replacement cost, there is nothing an activity
*r can do to hold these costs down. If the material is available in
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the Havy supply system, the activity commander must use it; and the Havy
supply system does not always provide the most economical source for an item.
Ofce activity commander gets part of his inventory financed by outside funds,
e.g., the Havy Stock Fund, and he pays the going rate when he uses the
material.
When material is procured for the direct material inventory ()ML)
with Navy Industrial Fund money, an activity commander's position is closer
to that of his civilian counterpart; the inventories of "both are limited "by
the working capital a.mailable.
For better or for worse, an activity coamaander -mist abide by all
governmental procurement regulations. 2hese may make for honesty in procure-
ment and theoretically for the lowest cost. 'Bxey also slow down the procure-
ment process which, in turn, can lead to costly material expediting or even
costlier losses of time.
2here are things which an activity in iiiMimillii i can do to control his
material costs, and tbere are things which he cannot do. Both areas should
be identified and recognised. She action that can be taken to control
material costs fcs dependent on whether costs are, in fact, the paramount con-
j^^eration in military production. If the answer is f:yes," and if the affir-
mative answe- eoaatfl I'rcm a sufficiently exalted level, material costs can be
controlled more completely than they have been -to date. But if other consid-
erations take precedence—and they may legitimately because the safety of the
United States la at stake-— 1then the control of material costs wiH continue
to leave sometiling &o be desired. At the present tine, the activity commander
is not free to control these costs.
Baere are other factors which cannot be controlled by an activity
commander which also tend to increase costs. For e^cample, the customers of
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industrial-funded activities are themselves financed by appropriations.
Expenditure limitations have been forced on these customers by executive
order. Qhe executive order came about because the debt ceiling vas about
to be violated, but the expenditure limitations continued after the crisis
passed. Tb.9 amount authorized in an appropriation is available for expendi-
ture only in increments. This necessitates the stretch-out of work which
could otherwise be completed more quickly. Ihe cost of these stretch-outs
36
caonot be estimated, but there can be no doubt that it is very substantial.
In the nature of things, the commander of a naval industrial acti-
vity has inadequate control over pixxiaction, men, c^.si materials. Control of
production, men, ami U&9 is essential to iinanciel r.anagement. She
assertion that responsibility for financial njanagement has o&en centralized
in the activity commauder is not in accordance vith the facts. It cannot
be in accordance with the facts until some far-reaching changes are made to
increase the activity commanders • autonomy. Anl ether considerations make
it unlikely that the necessary changes will ever be acceptable.
16
* "Interview with Captain E. H. Eatcheller, JSarch 16, 1959*

CHAPTER V
THE NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND AMD THE COMPTROLLER
Generally speaking the importance of the comptroller in the
industrial establishment of the Defense Department is not appre-
ciated and his role is not understood. One industrial commanding
officer remarked that, "no comptroller is going to control me. "37
Complementary Concepts—Comptrollership in the Department of Defense
was established by the National Security Amendments Act of 19^9 . This was
also the act which authorized the use of industrial funds for financing
industrial-commercial type activities of the Department of Defense.
Section 401 of the act prescribed that;
There is hereby established the Comptroller of the Depart-
ment of Defense. The Comptroller shall establish and supervise
the execution of principles, policies, and procedures to be
followed in connection with organizational and administrative
matters relating to:
i.) the preparation and execution of budgets
ii.) fiscal, cost, operating and capital property accounting
iii.) progress and statistical reporting
iv.) internal audit, and policies and procedures relating
to the expenditure and collection of funds administer-
ed by the Department of Defense.38
Section 402 prescribed that:
** ' Baport of the Industrial Activities Working Group, p. 15.




The secretary of each military department shall cause
budgetary, accounting, and statistical reporting, internal
audit and administrative structure and managerial procedure
relating thereto in his department to be organized and conducted
in a manner consistent with operations of the Comptroller of the
Department of Defense. 39
In his memorandum setting forth "Comptroller Functions and
Organization," the Secretary of Defense expanded upon these
responsibilities and specified them in more explicit detail.
He added the supervisory responsibility with respect to dis-
bursing and receiving cash; the implementation of working capi-
tal funds ; and statistical and progress reporting including the
analysis and interpretation of reports. He specifically refer-
red to various types of accounting—appropriation, property,
and cost accounting—as well as to all phases of budget adminis-
tration. This prescribed array of activities is almost exactly
comparable to the "standard" functions of the business control-
ler, excepting only the inclusion of cash disbursing and receiv- . Q
lag which are normally the responsibility of a business treasurer.
As a result of the act and of the memorandum, some naval industrial
activities were being equipped with comptrollers at about the time they were
transferring to industrial fund financing. In other cases, a comptroller
was established before the transition of industrial fund financing.
In April 1952, the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard established a
Comptroller Department and concurrently began operations under
the Naval Industrial Fund. . . . The former Fiscal Department
became the Accounting and Disbursing Division of the new Comp-
troller Department. On 1 July 1953* the Charleston Naval Ship-
yard, with a newly established Comptroller Department, cut over
to industrial fund operations. . • . Norfolk and other yards are
scheduled to shift subsequently. The date on which each yard will
change over depends to a large extent on the availability of funds,
the ability to obtain competent staffing, the rate at which in-
doctrination and training can proceed, and the completion of pre-
liminary panel surveys. Comptroilership operation is more than a
new system of accounting. In addition to the Accounting and Dis-
bursing Division, formerly the Fiscal Department, the organization
of the Comptroller Department provides for an Internal Control Divi-




Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice
(Hew York: Stratford Press Inc., 195*0, PP« 223-224.
.
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The advantages cannot be realized without certain Inevitable
factors • • • additional personnel are required. There may be a
reluctance on the part of existing departments and shops to ac-
cept any change in long established procedures. • . . These atti-
tudes can be overcome by education and indoctrination in the new
system. • . . The problems confronting a new comptroller include
many which cannot be visualized before duty is actually assigned.
• . . The answers to these problems cannot be found in manuals,
handbooks, or directives. The difficulty in obtaining qualified
top bracket personnel within the classifications of 19^9 is as
serious in the field of accounting as it is in "fee engineering
field. . . . However, regardless of disadvantages or problems,
real or imaginary, Industrial Fund operation is now a statutory
requirement and will necessitate yard adjustments in operations
to conform to the comptrollership system.
^
Identical Difficulties .—Naval industrial and commercial activities
have had comptrollers for at least five years. Insofar as the basic func-
tions of comptrollership—budgeting and accounting—are concerned, the con-
cept can be declared a success. Comptroller departments perform as effi-
ciently as the fiscal divisions which they replaced. But insofar as the
broader functions of comptrollership—the functions of which the Controllers*
Institute is so proud, the functions which distinguish controllers from
accountants—are concerned, the comptrollership concept in the Navy has not
been an unqualified success.
These broad functions nave been stated many ways and in many, many
words. They can be stated briefly: controllership in the military ser-
vices, as elsewhere, is built around the central function of providing
significant information to management. The comptroller influences management
decisions because the quality of the decisions made is dependent upon: first,
the basic intelligence and experience of the person making the decision and,
second, upon the adequacy of his information regarding the problem to be
solved. As envisioned, the military comptroller should be an important
G. L. Countryman, "Hew Controllership System Introduced in Ship-
yards," BuShips Journal, August, 1953> PP» 23-2U.
Cf., Report of the Industrial Activities Working Group, p. 15.
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member of the management team whose information and guidance influence the
commander and top executives to operate the activity economically, effi-
ciently, and effectively.
Eiere may have been and there may be naval comptrollers who have per-
formed exactly as it was planned that they should. If so, however, they
have accomplished the nearly impossible by the sheer force of their indi-
vidual personalities-—not by virtue of their positions as comptrollers. Why
is the naval comptroller failing to achieve the influence which the civilian
comptroller enjoys? Many explanations have been offered, and no doubt most
of them contain elements of truth. Bit the basic reason seems to be the old
difficulty: at naval industrial and commercial activities, costs are not
the paramount consideration.
Frederick C. Masher is saying the same thing when he writes:
Controllers grew up to meet the demands of increasing complexity
and bigness in private enterprise. In that realm, they have proven
useful. The defense of the United States has often heen called the
biggest ""business" in the country. In fact, each of the military
departments is bigger, by almost every measure, than any private
enterprise, therefore, so the logic runs, they should have con-
trollers. A flaw in this reasoning is that the organisation for
defense of the United States is not a business in the standard sense
of the term. It eaploys businesses and business practices, and it
perhaps should use more of them. But essentially its functions are
public and governmental; the processes and the factors entering
into decisions concerning it are political; the measurement of per-
formance in terms of objectives in peacetime is political and in
wartime rests upon military success or failure, ultimately upon
national survival,^
3he fact that costs are not primary determinants at naval industrial
activities is probably the insuperable difficulty. It is the fatal defect
which means that the naval comptroller can never have the effectiveness of
the typical comptroller in private enterprise. Biere are other defects in
the military comptroller set-up.
k3 _




Bie profit motive is missing:
Bxe basic and ultimately the only criterion of business
success and failure is profit and loss, which, in the last
analysis, can be measured only in monetary terms. Financial
data must therefore be the core of the information essential
to business management.^
Except insofar as the lack of a profit motive means that costs will
be secondary or tertiary considerations, the profit motive's absence is not
a situation which dictates absolutely that naval industry must inevitably
differ from private industry. Were it not for other factors, "breaking
even" could provide military industrial leadership with as much incentive as
"making a profit." After all, military industrial leadership has a great
deal of experience with precisely that sort of thing in personal finance.
Ihe purpose of cost accounting in the industrial activities of
the Defense Department are practical ly identical with those of
private industry. (The much touted absence of the profit motive,
the profit motive which is supposed to be so all-pervasive in pri-
vate accounting, does not turn out to be as significant as often
assumed. In one private concern, we may budget for an average net
profit of 3%, in another the goal is^lO^ or %, How much dif-
ferent is the situation if we reduce our profit objective to 0$ in
the Defense establishment? Itegardless of the size of the target
or its plus or minus characteristics in both situations, the es-
sential relationship is a matching of revenues and expenses on
whatever reasoned basis "policy" has established.^
!Eae position of the controller in the military organization is
probably a more serious hindrance to his effective operation. !Ehe Industrial
Activities Working Group lamented that the military comptroller had not
taken his place as a full partner on the management team. Frederick C.
Mosher pointed out some of the reasons why the military comptroller has not
Ibid., p. 199.





and cannot become the full partner which the Industrial Activities Working
Group envisioned.
In a third important respect, however, there is doubt whether
the military comptrollerahips are in conformity with the business
doctrine. This is that they should have a channel and a sense of
responsibility outside the hierarchy of the organization. To be
sure, they do have such a channel in law and in form ... but it
is hardly imaginable that the military comptroller could act as a
checker or informer on his department directly to the secretary-
-
i.e., that he would report anything seriously critical about the
command or give advice on change of iajportant policy without clear-
ing it with his military chief. The comptroller is part of the
military "team" which is another way of saying that his allegiance
to the command is undivided. ^7
These differences which distinguish the comptroller concept in the
military from the comptroller concept in private enterprise act to vitiate
the military comptrollers" effectiveness. But there are no reasons why
these differences (they are not always defects) should reduce his effective-
ness to nil. The military coj^troller~-especially one operating with indus-
trial fund financing—should still be able to do a great deal to hold the
line against rising costs. It is worthy work.
Initial Errors.
~
Ihe use of the Havy Industrial Pund system of financial
management, which provides for budget participation and re-
sponsibility for expenditures at ii '.vidua! cost centers, has
resulted in a greater awareness of eo3ts throughout all levels
of shipyard management. This increase in co3t consciousness
^q
has led to better control of expenses and resultant economies.
More than anything else, the foregoing quotation is an exaggerated
expression of a hope. It is an unintentionally candid comment on the status
of naval cost consciousness before industrial fund financing. The fact is
'Mosher, Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice , p. 219.
Excerpts from ComPeari Harbor KavSipYd Itr dtd. 20 July 1955 to
Chief, BuShips as quoted in The Havy Industrial Fund Program, Part IV.
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that the comptrollership concept and industrial fund financing did not pro-
duce, ipso facto , a cost consciousness throughout all levels of shipyard
management. All levels of shipyard management continued to he interested
in doing good work on schedule. Hhere is even some evidence that, freed
from the shackles of appropriation, allotment, and project order accounting,
49
shipyard management grew less, not more, cost conscious. *
If any blame attaches to this situation, some of it must surely be-
long to the comptrollers themselves. They tried to do too much too soon.
Perhaps they believed their own publicity. In the early days, a reasonable
man might have been justified in believing that a change in the method of
financing could metamorphose governmental industrial activities into
facsimiles of private industrial enterprises. And he could also have be-
lieved that private industrial enterprises are 5jivariahly economical,
efficient, and effective. But disillusion would not have been long in com-
ing. The first of these assumptions proved untrue when tested empirically,
and there is reason enough for skepticism in regard to the second.
In addition, military comptroller personnel suffer from an occupa-
tional disease that afflicts most military personnel, the effect of which
has often been underestimated or overlooked. !Bieir tenure is not long and
if they are to make a mark, they must make it quickly. Civilian personnel
in the military comptroller programs were eag©r because they knew that
50higher ratings were in the offing. In short, military comptroller person-
nel may have tried to move too fast. And they moved against formidable in-
difference, if not outright opposition.
49
Cf., fieport of the Industrial Activities Working Group , p. 13 et
passim.
Report of the Industrial Activities Working Group , p. 66*
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Ironically, it will often be the management which the comp-
troller is trying to serve which will want to "block his efforts
to change the existing systems. Under these conditions the comp-
troller will need to possess a large order of human relations
know-how in addition to his technical proficiency if he is to be
really effective. 51
Beyond the absolute needs of the appropriation responsibil-
ities, the (appropriation) accounting system did very little to
produce management information. 52
The comptrollership function is the collection, presentation,
and interpretation of quantitative infoisaatiou to aid management
in making its decisions. 53
Industrial funding produced a flood Of financial information. It
inundated a top management that was still primarily interested in meeting
schedules and doing fine work. Asking the production officer of a naval
shipyard to give careful consideration to a z fc of costs is roughly equi-
valent to asking the President of the United States to give careful consider-
ation to the plight of the JSavajo. Ho one denies that the Havajo has grave
problems, but ....
Initially, and to a lesser extent to date, the financial information
was presented to management; couched in accountants ? jargon that was next
door to incomprehensible. 2he following examples are taken from weekly and
monthly reports to management. !Biey are not horrible examples—they typify
the style and content. Ihey are quoted out of context, but the clarity is
not altered by restoration.
One shipyard operated at an under-absorption of approximately
$113,000., split $40,000. under in the general centers and
$73>000. under in the production centers . • . the under-absorption
is slightly higher than in June. The production expense centers
contributed 60$ of the total. Hae drop in direct labor hours ex-








Gas plant costs increased by more than 50$ over June due to
Inauguration of the accrual concept to Purchased Gas and Direct
Material.
Heat will be under-absorbed throughout the summer due to
shutting off heat distribution. This situation will reverse
itself when the heat is turned on in the fall.
The adjustment (credit) of 50 thousand to expense resulting
from the establishment of the Deferred Charges Inventory Account
is attributed to: (1) the dollar value of material (reproduction
supplies, PPC Forms, and JEAI-i cards) picked up in this account and
credited to expense, and (2) the closing of certain accrual expense
joes for this material which were over accrued at time of closing
and resulted in a credit to expense. 5^
Such financial reports to management failed to have the impact that
was expected. At one shipyard the Comptroller Department received in two
years only a single indication that the commander was getting the Monthly
Financial and Operating Statement with Supporting Schedules. He scratched
his new desk with a loose staple and sent over unequivocal instructions that
the reports were to be stapled more carefully in the future. Even a member
of top management who had accounting training [he was a former auditor] was
forced to ask for translations, interpretations, summaries, explanations.
It should be added in behalf of naval comptroller departments that they
have made a steady effort to render their published information comprehen-
sible. But much remains to be done.
Perhaps the most significant development under the Havy Indus-
trial Fund operation has been the establishment of Cost Center
reviews. During these reviews, actaial expenditures are compared
with related budgeted amounts, and responsible personnel are re-
quired to explain all important variances. This review is being
aggressively prosecuted within this shipyard, and the most bene-
ficial result has been a notable increase in cost consciousness
through every strata of shipyard management. Although intangible
and not susceptible to measurement, this awareness of cost and the
54
The sources of these quotations have been omitted. There is no
point in singling out shipyards in this context. The quotations are all
taken from published financial reports of naval shipyards. The reports of
all shipyards are similar.
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attendant necessity for intelligent fiscal planning can be of
inestimable value in improving the yard economy. 55
In point of fact, cost center reviews at shipyards were conferences
"between comptroller personnel and representative 3 of the cost center con-
cerned. Often the shop master himself would attend and he would he sup-
ported "by his shop authority on finance. Shop masters are, in most cases,
men of outstanding ability; hut they are not men primarily concerned with
finance. The comptroller representatives would ask if the shop master was
getting all the financial information he wanted and needed. Invariably be
would say that he was, and would imply that he was, in fact, receiving a
superabundance, a bellyful. If, however, the comptroller department had not
been bothering him, he would state how much better he thought the new system
was. On this happy note, the cost center review participants would run down
the most recent report on the shop's budgeted and actual cost figures:
supervision, shop planning, shop general, safety program, training program,
fuel, minor shop store issues, etc.
2he procedure had inherent defects. fhere is nothing wrong with
living within a budget on such things as "shop general" expense. And there
is nothing wrong per se with comparing actual expenditures with budgeted
amounts by object classification. But, whether or not the shop master
realized it, the really important expenses were not—and are not*—within his
control. His shop overhead rate was far more dependent on the uncontrollable
direct labor hours worked than on the controllable minor expense items.
There are two needed improvements which quite obviously are
waiting action by the trained imaginative comptroller. . . . The
first needed improvement is a much closer study of the important
^OomMare HavShpYd Itr. dtd. 21 July 1955 to Chief, BuShips as
quoted in She Maw Industrial Fund Program, Part IV.
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line of demarcation between controllable and non-controllable ex-
penses within the departments or shops. Failure to make this dif-
ferentiation on a realistic basis throws the whole matter of con-
trolling shop expenses into disrepute and disregard. Dae depart-
mental foreman (shop master) must be completely convinced that the
cost controlling task put upon him is a feasible one, that he
really can control the expenses for which he is being held, and
that no non^xmtrollable items are going to confuse the picture of
his actual performance as measured by the accounts. Such a careful
division of the departmental expenses between controllable and non-
controllable elements will make the calculation of departmental
efficiency more than just another calculated figure in a report.
She second needed improvement is the application of the principles
of variable budgeting. At the point of product costing, this
problem runs into aU the intricacies of stand-by, practical
capacity, and top-level overhead rate considerations . . . the
philosophy of the variable budget could be used by the comptroller
to get realistic expense control at the departmental level. 5&
Cost center reviews were friendly discussions of peanuts. Under the
circumstances, they may have done as much to discredit the comptrollership
concept as they did to promote cost consciousness. Oils error is not ex-
clusively the Jlavy's, however; the Ifevy was just being businesslike. In the
1957-58 recession, segments of American business tried much the same sort
of thing. But private enterprise was quick to learn, or rediscover, that
worthwhile savings had to come from increasing the productivity of labor,
controlling material costs, simplifying product lines, and streamlining the
57
organization. Streamlining the organization means discharging unnecessary
employees . Hot aU of these methods are available to naval industrial
activities, bat the ones that are should be copied.
In all probability the most enthusiastic proponent of industrial
fund financing and the comptrollership concept would not care to declare the
experiment with internal review and audit an imqualified success.
56
Report of the Industrial Activities Working Group, p. 29.
5
'Edward T. a&ompson, ''Sie Cost-Cutting Urge, " Fortune, Itech, 195$,
pp. 119-121, 228, 230.
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There is some difference of opinion as to how far the
internal audit should go toward checking into matters of
substantive performance , i.e., matters that go beyond the
record keeping and information system. Here, again, the
advocates of the "strong " auditor concept see no limita-
tion.. . . We would eicpect to find that the comptroller
at the local activity vould nave reporting to him a division
of internal audit and control. Shis division should have
two sections, one being the systems and procedures section
and the other being the internal audit section. 5o
No doubt the effectiveness of the internal audit division of the
comptroller department varied from activity to activity. But, in general,
the internal auditors ran afoul of military relationships. Even when the
internal auditors were wholeheartedly supported by the comptroller—which
was by no means always the ca3e—the comptroller himself lacked the power
to carry their recommendations through to fruition. Sometimes the reeom-
mendaticns were petty, but, even when they were not, top management, when it
bothered to take notice, either damned or pointedly ignored them* One audit
concept has since been modified, and at the larger naval industrial acti-
vities, eqpnasie has been shifted to the external audit by representatives
of the Comptroller of the JHavy.
Budgeting was not as effective as it might have been* She budget
was based on expected workload which was not determined locally. 2he work-
load was modified frequently at higher levels, and since the budget was in-
flexible, results were often misleading. Oftere was a tendency to misplace
the emphasis in attempting to control cost3. Attempts at internal review,
audit, and control were, for the most part, failures. But:
Our own investigations made it quite clear- to us that the
situation is not one that can be cleared up by fiat no matter
•58
^Report of the Industrial Activities Working Group, p. 39*
^Lecture by Captain J. B. Kackley, Supply Corps, United States
Havy, to the Bavy Graduate Comptrollership Program, She George Washington
University, March 20, 1959-
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how wall conceived. We are convinced that the situation calls
for a long program of patient development, organization, train-
ing, and education. We are certain that such, means can hring
about substantial Ii^proveiaent in efficiency, saving hundreds of
millions of tax dollars, and a stronger national defense. 60
60





"Brainstorm" means using the brain to stoxm a creative problem—
and to do so in commando fashion, with each stormer audaciously
attacking the same objective.- 1 . . . Four rules for brainstorming
emphasize an unfettered atmosphere as participants "go to play" on
a problem unhampered by judicial reasoning, "musts," "do's,"
"don'Vs," and "can't's."^
"What could be done . —Brainstorming the problem, "How can naval in-
dustrial enterprises be made more like private corporations to the end that
they operate with the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness which distin-
guishes private enterprise.' 5 sLould produce suggestions very like the
following*
Someone near the summit in government inust decide that cost consid-
erations are paramount in military production* This intelligence must be
promulgated from top to bottom. Everyone must recognise that to make even
one exception is tantamount to pulling the thumb from the dike.
Activity commanders must understand that henceforth the control of
costs is their most important duty* They will be expected to produce work
that is acceptable to their customers, but they uaist produce it at the
Alex F. Osbora, Applied Imagination: Principles and Procedures of
Creative thinking (New York: Charles Scribner rs Sons, 195% P- &0.
Lester R. Bittei, "Brainstorming: Better Way to Solve Plant




absolute minimm cost. If tkis means doing the work quickly, then expendi-
ture limitations that cause stretch-outs will he ignored. If this means
doing the work slowly, then customers' schedules that cause speed-ups will
he changed. Activity commanders should realize that their .personal success
will depend on their success in controlling costs.
If an activity commander is to he given this responsibility, he must
be given the authority to discharge it. His relationship to a management
bureau will be that of a corporation president to a board of directors. Bae
activity commander can be replaced, but as long as he is in the job he has
the authority to do the job in his own way. lerhaps a division manager of
a thoroughly decentralized corporation would be a better model for what the
activity commander should be. He will have the right to select his top
management military and civilian personnel j he will be able to retain them
as long as he needs and wants them. He must have the right to hire and fire
civilian personnel without regard to Civil Service regulations. Veterans*
preference legislation will not apply to the employees of naval industrial
activities. 'Bie wage rates paid will be the uost advantageous that the
activity commander can negotiate for the Llav: . Ihe activity commander will
have to be able to adjust his manning levels to planned production as quickly
as would, for example, the head of General Motors * Buick Division.
The activity commander must have the authority to influence his work-
load. He should be allowed to bid competitively for work. He must be
allowed to refuse work if he feels that he cannot do it economically. Dur-
ing slack periods he may accept work which he would otherwise refuse. Re-
search will be restricted to applied research. A generous expense account
will be provided to enable the activity commander to entertain his prospects:
the fleet, force, and type commanders.

*5
These customers must also be ingaressed with the importance of
getting their work done for the lowest possible cost. Customers wi31 shop
around. Work will go to the loa/est "bidder. Customers mist understand that
they are responsible for the accomplishment of their military missions "but
the missions must be accomplished as inexpensively as possible. In most
cases of doubt, the mission will be modified or its fulfillment will be post-
poned. All other things not being equal, the officer who does what he is
required to do by the least expansive means vill be appraised most highly.
The activity commander will be allowed to procure his raw materials
where and as he chooses. If in his judgment speculation in raw materials is
wise, he will speculate. In this respect he will be censured only for poor
judgment. If the build-up of inventories embarrasses his cash position, he
will have the authority to borrow at the prevailing interest rate. The loans
can be guaranteed by the Ctovernoent. The Navy supply system will be used as
a source of supply only for those items which are competitively priced. The
industrial activity will have its own procurement and supply divisions; they
will be financed by the ac. *s funds, the liavy Industrial Fund. Govern-
mental procurement regulations will not apply to industrial activities.
But there will have to be some checks on the autonomous activity com-
mander to make certain that he is fulfilling his responsibilities economic-
ally, efficiently, and honestly. So the comptroller should x-eport directly
to the management bureau on all aspects of the activity commander* s effi-
ciency. This should also increase the coiaptroller's effectiveness. As a
military courtesy, the comptroller might apprise the activity commander of
the general tenor of his reports. The comptroller's fitness reports must
be prepared by the management bureau.
It will certainly develop that some naval industrial activities can-
not produce economically, efficiently, and effectively. This will be the
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case in spite of the effoits of hard-working commanders and comptrollers.
The activities nay, for example, be using facilities tnat are 1?0 years old,
be 3,000 miles removed from their principal suppliers, he located in areas
where six months of the year only Eskimos could he productive in outside
jobs, be situated where high wage rates prevail. Neither WBrtWJJtibtl produc-
tivity nor minimizing costs will be possible. Customers will necessarily
go to the more efficient activities which will grow larger and even more
efficient. When it is established that an activity is uneconomic, it must
be closed. Economic operation will be the sole determinant. Other factors,
such as mobilization ••equirements and political considerations, will be
ignored and forgotten, protesting Congressmen—should there be any—will "be
given a well-written, standardized official handout on the need for economy
in the Department of Defense.
These are suggestions for heightening the likeness of naval indus-
trial activities to private industrial activities. Abandoning the rules of
bi^ainstorming, a cynic night observe that certain of the recommended changes
will not, cannot, should not, and must not be accepted. Ergo, in certain
basic respects, naval industrial activities will never be like private in-
dustrial activities. Does it follow then that nothing can be done? Is it
axiomatic that naval industrial activities cannot be run economically,
efficiently, and effectively? 2ne answer is "Ho."
Perhaps they cannot be run as economically, efficiently, and effec-
tively as private industrial activities, but industrial fund financing and
its concomitants provide accurate co3t3, and accurate costs are the sine qua
non of economical management. With this information, management has been
pursuing and will continue to pursue cost reduction programs.
What is being done.—For example, reliable estimates indicate that
the success of the shipyards' Production, Planning, and Control (PPC)

systems has managed to offset 50;'> of the inflationary rise in the co3t of
go
shipbuilding materials and labor* FPC is a complex, industrially engineer-
ed system for decentralizing planning and scheduling; these functions are
concentrated in the shops, hut there is centralized, coordinated control.
Under the old procedures, planning and scheduling were i>erformed by one top-
level department. Shis department now coordinates the planning and Bchedul-
ing done by the shops. It seems to vork better.
It could be noted, in an attempt to indicate that the Havy is not
always complacent and confident, that PPC represents an effort to make im-
provements in an area in which the Navy has frequently been appraised as
satisfactory
Suit difficult problem of over-all vork scheduling has been
well handled in the industrial activities, especially in the
shipyards where it is present in an exceptionally acute degree*
!Hhe necessity of the situation has over the years compelled the
shipyards to work out a solution.^
Ihe system was not implemented without opposition; it was a change
and it was opposed. Hhere was no shortage of sophisticated persons to pro-
claim that the system would not work. But it promised handsome economies
through improved utilization of men and more intelligent procurement of
materials. So PPC was Implemented and is establishing itself as an improve-
ment. Results should be increasingly gratifying.
!There are still many dollars to be saved through material control.
Shipbuilding material problems arise in connection with material that is not
on hand; seldom with material that is available. Since this is the case,
production people are prone to order three of an item to make absolutely
"^Interview with Captain S. H. Batcheller, March IS, 1359
•
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certain that one viH be on hand when needed. Ihis is not always waste,
of course; a labor force standing idle for want of material is also costly.
But obviously the practice often leads to waste, "We oust have one of a
65
required item, yes. But we do not need three." *
Even at a small shipyard, the weekly list of procurement items requir-
ing special attention usually runs to fifty. Obese often necessitate costly
phone calls, air transportation, and duplication of shipments. If the
material arrives on time, the effort will be declared a success; in such in-
stances, cost is not considered. It is the rare shipyard employee who has
not seen such a major procurement effort crowned with success (perhaps triple
success) only to see the material put aside for a month before being used.
Baere is no clearcut answer and the problem will be under study as long as
naval industrial activities e^ist. It will ne/er be completely solved. But
the situation can be mitigated by increasingly careful planning and schedul-
ing and, above all, judicious application of common sense.
Great savings would also result if the customers of Industrial ac-
tivities could somehow be made cost conscious. For the most part, shipyards*
custoners are type commanders. fi3aey are military men vitally concerned with
operations, schedules, material readiness, strategy, and tactics. "For
eveiy customer who has scrutinized cost, there are one hundred who have
66
worried about meeting schedules." Shipyards have at least one thing in
common with civilian business: the customer is usually right. One attitude
of the customer necessarily influences the attitude of the activity's com-
mander. Meeting schedules becomes more important than holding down costs*
Shipyard commanders are frequently disenchanteu loy using overtime to meet an
iSBButable schedule only to see the vessel completed but idled by a change in
^Interview with Captain E. H. Batcheller, March 16, 1959*
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the schedule* Again there is no simple answer* The jflvtrtTHwg of centuries
cannot he changed overnight, and In scoot cases it should not be changed* One
hesitates to hang a price tag on the nation's security*
"All eoddam auditors ou^it to he in the bottom of belli"67 But the
^_uiatf newspaper reports that:
. . • The United States Fleet is not in an acceptable state
of readiness a board of civilian ship experts has warned the Havy.
. . . Bias* for the bad mterlal condition of most of the Wavy war*
ships was put os the age, the tempo of operation of ships and the
funds available for maintenaace, tMxlernization, and new construe*
tioa. . . . One report declared that the nation aaxst sake a choice:
either provide a substantial increase in caintenaaca, Modernisation,
and new construction funds or decide it cannot afford tke size Bavy
nov aalntaiaed ana cut . to a sis* - funds allowed ^
are sufficient to keep the reduced number of ships in good shape* *
Navy comiasioaed and paid for the study* And the findings
the "civilian ship ©asserts" ring too pleasing to the purchaser to be pro-
claimed thoroughly objective. It is not inconceivable that the Ita-vy is us**
ing "independent" studies and the %$$&» to a.. » say, blaclg.tail
—
roney from Congress . So satter if the tactics l it obvious, even the
most operations-o-.'iented ild be able to see that, in peace-time,
cost and strategy- are not independentj they cannot la all ways free.
filie search for an acceptable compromise between feasible e^enditure
and desirable strategy will continue. Iadasti-i&l fund financing of naval
nsanufaeturing activities has produced fact ing on the cost portion of
the problem. It has provided inS&risation which must be known before intelli*
cent action can be taken to control costs* In all areas much uiore can be
^Attributed to General Oeorse S. I^atton as cruoted in 3fo3her, Program
iBjifllflftting: Theory and Practice
j
p. 1^1.
"••Civilian *f Havy Piads Fleet $tot iieady, 'one Washington Post
and Jimes Herald, !<iarea 31, 19^9, P* Al-2.
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dons. And in all areas there are naval personnel who are trying to do it.
They are trying to run naval activities econosiically and efficiently; that
is # presumably, in a businesslike way. But they are struggling with inter-
nal and ezrfcernal limitations not known to free enterprise. It is well if




The present industrial fund method of financing—or some-
thing very similar—is the answer to the anomaly of the indus-
trial unit within the governmental accounting structure. 69
1. A naval industrial activity is not a private corporation . In
spite of superficial similarities, naval industrial and commercial activities
are not private corporations. Well-meaning experts have tried to enhance the
similarities. But the factors influencing decisions make the big difference.
Decisions at naval activities have not as yet been based, primarily on cost
considerations. Chronological, technological, and political considerations
have taken precedence.
2. Costs can be controlled more effectively, but first controversial
changes must be made and the changes are unlikely . Perhaps decisions at
naval activities should be dictated by costs. Perhaps the day will come when
they must be. If so, industrial fund financing and accounting provide manage-
ment with the information that will be needed. A genuine buyer-seller
relationship between military consumers and producers would result in lower
costs. So far the buyer-seller relationship has not developed end it is
never likely to. Someone in authority must decide that costs are the primary
consideration. The activity commanders must be given more autonomy, authorily
commensurate to responsibility* The decision is not likely to be made. The
changes will never come about.
69
^Beport of the Industrial Activities Working Group , p. 13.
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3« Industrial Fund financing leads to more efficient accounting .
The use of the Bavy Industrial Fund is the best method of financing naval
industrial and commercial activities. Industrial fund financing leads to
accurate budgeting, accounting, cost accumulation, and reporting. These
factors alone more than Justify the change. Techniques can always be im-
proved; the basic plan is sound.
**• ^lUfc&^y comptrollers can be useful; they can diacourage the rise
in costs . The expectations and claims arising incident to Ravy Industrial
Fund financing were foolishly optimistic. Industrial fund financing cannot
produce economy, efficiency, and effectiveness automatically—not even when
combined with the comptrollership concept. In spite of the limitations in-
herent In the military situation, however, the concomitants of Industrial
fund financing are potentially valuable tools. A clever comptroller can use
these tools—even though they may be blunted by military circumstance—to
inhibit the advance of costs. But the comptroller can do nothing alone: he
must have cooperation. In order not to undermine the entire comptrollership
concept, he should avoid being penny-wise and pound-foolish. Significant
savings must come from the control of material costs and increases in the
productivity of labor. This requires continuing team effort. An astute
comptroller can be an iigportant member of this team. The effort is necessary
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